Abstract-This paper presents an energy-efficient power allo cation for relay-aided heterogeneous networks subject to coupling convex constraints, that make the problem at hand a generalized Nash equilibrium problem. The solution to the resource allocation problem is derived using a sequential penalty approach based on the advanced theory of quasi variational inequality, which allows the network to converge to its generalized Nash equilibrium in a distributed manner. The main feature of the proposed approach is its decomposability, which leads to a two-layer distributed algorithm with provable convergence.
I. INTRODUCTION
The wireless research community has deployed a massive effort to study and design transmission techniques taking into account the cost of energy in wireless communications [1] . Towards this end, the concept of link capacity per unit cost originally proposed in [2] has been widely adopted in many different contexts. Just to name few examples, the problem of energy efficient precoding for wireless terminals equipped with multiple antenna capability is studied in [3] , whereas [4] and [5] investigate energy efficient link adaptation strategies for wideband systems.
From an architectural point of view, the hypothesis of im proving the energy efficiency (EE) performance through a very dense deployment of self-organizing, low-cost, and low-power base stations has been investigated in [6] . This perspective has stimulated an intense research activity on heterogeneous networks, which lie on the idea of multiple radio access technologies and transmission techniques coexisting in the same area to ensure the most efficient usage of the spectrum resource with the minimum waste of energy [7] .
A common way of designing such heterogeneous multiuser systems is by optimizing the (weighted) sum of the users' ob jective functions. Despite its promise, solution methods based on "socially-efficient" optimization are often too demanding, the main difficulty lying in adopting distributed techniques
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le Telecomunicazioni (CNIT), Parma, Italy with limited signaling among the users. On the contrary, game theoretical approaches based on competition among users lead to alternative distributed algorithms that present advantages in term of robustness of convergence, scalability, and required quantity of message passing [8] . In this perspective, the design of wireless devices capable of self-enforcing the negotiated agreements on the resource usage has been investigated in [9] [11]. In [9] , the authors proposed an accurate analysis of the equilibrium point for a group of competitive users aiming at maximizing their information rate in parallel Gaussian multi access channels. However, this capacity-based approach is not energy-efficient since the selfish behavior of players tends to increase the transmit power beyond reasonable values. To over come this, in [10] a power allocation game was proposed to maximize the EE of the users' links. Although interesting, the fr amework developed in [10] does not provide an analytically convergent algorithm. This gap has been recently fulfilled in [11] by making use of the quasi variational inequality (QVI) fr amework, originally introduced in [12] and successfully used in different fields such as economics and biology (see [13] and references therein). The main objective of this work is to apply the approach proposed in [11] to relay-aided heterogenous networks, in which different types of users may pursue different objectives. Moreover, minimum performance requirements will be guaranteed by imposing feasible strategy sets including also coupling convex constraints.
Notation: Matrices and vectors are denoted by bold letters:
IL , O L , and 1L are the L x L identity matrix, the LxI all-zero column vector, and the LxI all-one column vector, respectively. The set of positive real numbers (including 0) is denoted by JR, and e) T denotes transposition. The notation [x] + stands for max(O, x), We) denotes the Lambert W function [14] , defined to be the multivalued inverse of the function z = W(z)eW ( z ) for any z E <C, with <C being the set of complex numbers, and IE{· } denotes statistical expectation.
II. SYSTEM SCENARIO
Tw o-tier networks are a promising solution to reduce the energy consumption in cellular networks. Operationally, in a two-tier network small cells are integrated into existing macro-cellular networks, so that the latter can ensure wide-area coverage, whereas the small cells can carry most of the data traffic for low-mobility users within their short radio coverage.
More specifically, we consider the uplink of the two-tier network depicted in Fig. 1 We consider a two-time-slot transmission pattern, which is half-duplex in the sense that transmission and reception at the RSs do not occur simultaneously in the same frequency band. During the first time slot, the nodes belonging to the set II � {Ml U M2 US} are active, while the RSs are silent.
During the second time slot, the relays decode the messages of the two-hop MUs and forward them to the MBS while the two-hop MUs stay in the idle mode. This means that the set of active users during the second time-slot is I2 � {M 1 unus}.
We assume that the direct link between two-hop MUs and MBS is negligible due to large path-loss attenuation.
The performance achieved by a generic node k is mea sured by a two-dimensional payoff (utility) vector U k = [Uk,l, Uk,2] T , in which U k,l and Uk,2 denote the value of the kth objective function during the first and second time slots, respectively. Given the different classes of users populating the two-tier network described above, the utility U k,i achieved by the kth transmitter at the ith time slot depends on user k's type (as better detailed in the next section). More in detail, assuming to have a multicarrier system with N subchannels, each user can maximize its own pay off by regulating its own transmit power vector Pk,i = [ Pk,i(1), Pk,i (2) , ... , Pk,i(N)] T , where Pk,i(n) � 0 denotes node k transmit power over subchannel n E { I, ... , N } and time slot i E { 1 ,2}.1 In doing so, only local channel state information (CSI) is assumed to be available at node k. This amounts to saying that the kth node has only knowledge of Hk,k(n) for n = 1 , 2 , ... , N, where H j ,k(n) is the channel transfer function over the nth subchannel between transmitter j and transmitter k's receiver. As is known, the optimization of the network through centralized power control strategies is extremely challenging, as it requires the coordination among heterogeneous entities, thus making its solution weakly scalable and adaptive [8] . A possible way to overcome this obstacle is to make use of I Using the notation introduced above, it foUows that Pk, l = ON if k E n, and, analogously, Pk, 2 = ON if k E M2.
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• .. distributed (albeit suboptimal) algorithms based on a nonco operative game theoretical approach (e.g., [9] , [15]).
III. ANALYSIS OF THE GAME
The aim of this section is to study the power control problem as the solution of a non-cooperative game 9 = (K, {Ak }, {Uk} ), where the set of users K and user k's utility Uk have been introduced in Sect. II, and Ak � ]R 2 N is the power strategy set available to each user k. Aiming at studying the solution of g, the best response for each type of players is first derived and then used to define a QVI problem whose solution will coincide with the equilibrium of the game [11].
A. Macro-cell users
Following the aforementioned non-cooperative approach, we assume that MUs (at each time step i) target the maximization of their own information rates under a con straint on the maximum total power consumption. Other wise stated, the best response Bk,iC) taken by a MU user k E {Ml U M 2 } to a specific power allocation profile
Pk , i EIRN with P k,i being user k's maximum available total transmit power during time slot i and such that P k,i > 0 'Vk E M l and 'Vi E { 1 ,2} , and P k,l > 0 and Pk,2 = 0 'Vk E M2, respectively. In addition, U k,i(Pi) denotes the user k's utility function, which is given by (2) n=l where Rk ( Pi ) is the achievable information rate on the link between the kth MU and the MBS, and 
Using [9] , the best response (1) is given by the waterfilling mapping
where the nth component of the waterfilling operator is (6) and /-lk,i is such that I�Pk,i
Pk,i. Note that if Pk,2 = 0 B. Small-cell users
When dealing with SCUs, not only the rate maximization, but also the interference reduction between macro-cell and small-cell networks comes into play. Consequently, the best response taken by each user k E S can still be expressed by (1), but with a different utility function, defined as
where Rk(Pi) is given in (2), Wk is the (non-radiative) circuit power consumed at transmitter k [5] , [10] , and the set of feasible powers is defined as in (4) .
Adapting the results derived in [16] for the problem at hand, user k E S's best response Bk,i (P\k,i) can be still expressed by the waterfilling operator (5), provided that the water level /-lk,i is replaced by Ak,i = max{/-lk,i, vk,d where /-lk,i is such that I�Pk,i = Pk,i whereas
,t.
represents the water level that provides the maximum achiev able EE, measured as in (7), for a given interference allocation P\k,i without any constraint. In addition, where (13) with Vk,i defined as in (9) and such that the condition Rk (Zk,i(Vk,i) , P\k,i) -Vk,i(Wk + I�Zk,i(Vk,i)) = O . (14) is satisfied [5] . Hence, combining (7) with (14) , Vk,i is found to explicitly represent the unconstrained EE achievable by a user k E S for a given P\k,i'
C. Relay nodes
In the spirit of greening the network infrastructures, the powers selected by the RSs are also dynamically adapted to maximize the EE of the relay-destination transmission, simi larly to what considered by SCUs. RSs might also guarantee some minimum performance in terms of rates to the two-hop MUs, by keeping their information rate above a threshold. Hence, the best response taken by aRS kEn is in the form2
Bk,2 (PI ; P\k,2) = arg max Uk,2( P2 )
where the utility U k,2 ( P2 ) is defined as in (7), the constraint (16) accounts for the maximum total power Pk,2, whereas the constraint (17) is introduced to guarantee a minimum rate to the MU 7r (k) served by the RS k, with 7r : n --+ M2 being the function that associates the relay k with its served MU 7r (k) E M2. The set of feasible strategies for the RSs is then given by Ak,2 = {Pk,2 E JR� : I�Pk,2 � Pk,2, Rk(P2) ?: R1r ( k ) (pI ) } . Using the results in [5] and [16] , similarly to the case reported in Sect. III-B, (15) can be computed in a closed form using (5), with a water level Ak,2 = min {Vk,2, �k,2} where Vk,2 is defined as in (9), and (19) 1 N �k,2 = N 2 R, , ( k ) ( Pl ) ITn=1 'Pk, 2 ( n ) (20) corresponds to the power allocation yielding the minimum to tal power expenditure when the minimum-rate constraint (17) 2 Since RSs are not active in the first time slot, we report all quantities for the second time slot i = 2 only.
3 For the sake of notation, from now on we will harmonize the best-response functions for all users in the network, such that Bk i : IR N ( 2 K -1) -+ IR N Vk E K., meaning that Bk,i ( P\k ,i ; P\i ) is now ' a function of both the opponents' power allocation P\k ,i in time slot i, and the total power allocation P\i in the other time slot \i, with \i = 2 if i = 1, and \i = 1 if i = 2. Note that this notation is adopted in the remainder of the paper for mathematical convenience only, as it is straightforward to verify that p\ i has no practical impact on Bk,i when k E {M 1 UM2 US}. An analogous modification can be applied to the mappings tk ,i, such that tk ,i : IR N ( 2 K -1) -+ IR Vk E K.. is met with equality, under the assumption that /-Lk,2 :s; �k,2 ' with /-L k,i defined as in Sect. III-A, that ensures that the investigated problem is feasible.
Analogously to Sect. III-B, we can define a mapping t k ,2 : ]RN ( 2 K -l ) ---+ ]R using (12), provided that V k ,2 is replaced by the water level A k ,2 defined in (19) .
D. Generalized Nash equilibrium problem
Given the best-response functions reported in the sub sections above, we can now investigate the solution of the associated game g. Observe that introducing the minimum rate constraint (17) at the relay side imposes a coupling among the feasible per-slot strategy sets V k,i <;;; ]RN, thus making the distributed technique developed in [10] not directly usable.
The problem of finding the equilibrium of games with coupled constraints, called a generalized Nash equilibrium problem (GNEP), consists in computing the generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) points p*. 
k,i P\i, P\k,i with tk i defined as in Sects. III-B and III-C.
Finally, let P = [pi , p §] T be the generic strategy profile of g, and define the set-valued function 1)(p) = IT kEK Vk (p), where Vk = Vk,l X V k ,2, as
Prop. 1: The GNEP can be modeled as (p -p* f F(p*) ;::: 0 \lp E 1)(p*)
where
Fk,i( Pk,i, P\k,i ) = -V'Pk,iRk,i ( Pk,i, P\k,i ) ' (28) Proof' Consider the QVI in (27), where F is a continuous mapping and 1) is a set-valued function with closed and convex images. Under these conditions, and since 1) can be described by the parametric inequalities in (22) and (24), the QVI can be reformulated as a system of constrained equations via its Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions, as discussed in [13] . Thus, if a point p* jointly satisfies the KKT conditions of (27), then p* is a solution of the QVI. For the sake of briefness, we leave to the reader the easy task of verifying that the solution of the KKT system, associated to the kth user operating in the time slot i, corresponds to the best response Bk,i whose expressions have been discussed in the previous subsections. Consequently, the power allocation vector p* solving (27) is a GNE of the game.
•
IV. SEQUENTIAL PENALTY APPROACH
A common approach to deal with coupling constraints in game theory is the definition of a pricing scheme aiming at imposing those constraints to the users in a distributed fashion [17] . In this section, we make use of the proposed QVI formulation to derive a distributed algorithm to achieve the GNE of the game.
In spite of the huge potential of the QVI modeling, relatively few studies have been devoted to the numerical solution of finite-dimensional QVIs. Among them, [18] proposes a sequential penalty approach that enables the solution of the QVI via a sequence of modified VIs, in which the mapping F is decreased by a penalty term.
Formally, consider the iteration j, and let {p (j) } be a sequence of positive scalars satisfying prJ) < p (j+ l ) and tending to 00. Define also a sequence of 2K-dimensional vectors {, ( j ) } whose elements are computed as
with gk,iC) defined in (24). For
be then obtained as the solution of the following VIs:
In the sequel, we will discuss the convergence property of the proposed sequential penalty approach. In this sense, a key ingredient is the continuity of the coupling constraints with respect to the set of power allocation strategies P , as stated in the following proposition.
Prop. 2: Assuming that the maximum available powers Pk,2, for all RSs k E R, guarantee the feasibility of the associated best response problems, then gk,i( Pk,i, P\i; P\k,i ),
with k E SUR, is a continuous function with respect to all variables, and the solution of (30) converges to the GNE as j -+ 00.
Proof' The proposition will be proved by contradiction. and v(d"), fulfilling condition (14) . At the same time, we also know that Vk,i represents the maximum achievable value of energy-efficient utility (7) for a given interference level.
Since a fr actional program with a concave numerator and a linear denominator has a unique solution, this contradicts (3 1), thus concluding the first part of the proof. Eventually, it can easily be verified that, under the aforementioned continuity condition, the problem at hand fulfills the hypothesis of [IS, Theorem 3] , which guarantees the convergence of the penalty approach as j -+ 00.
V. DISTRIBUTED IMPLEMENTAT ION
Before studying the distributed implementation of the se quential penalty approach, let us consider the penalized VI problem (30), where , (j) is assumed to be a fixed exogenous parameter. This problem has been largely investigated in the literature and its solution can be obtained through the simul taneous iterative waterfilling with pricing (IWFP) algorithm outlined in Table I , whose convergence is guaranteed at the condition that mapping F is strongly monotone [17] .
In the remainder of this section, we propose a two-layer distributed algorithm in which the outer layer updates the pricing vector, while the inner layer solves the corresponding penalized VI problem via the IWFP algorithm. The design guideline for the outer-layer algorithm is provided by the following proposition. 
where, for the sake of readability, the dependence of p* from , has been omitted.
Proof' Consider (32) and write down its KKT conditions
Vk E JC and Vi:
According to (29), we have that Tk ,i must be equal to
for j -+ 00. Now, since Proposition 2 assures the convergence of the sequential penalty approach to a bounded solution, Tk'7 ) must be bounded too. At the same time, recalling that p (j) '-+ 00 when j -+ 00 and Tk�l is a nonnegative scalar, we have
(( 00 ) ( 00 ) ( 00 )) < 0 Th h ' , on y 1 gk,i P k,i ; P \k,i' P \i _ . en, t e statlOnanty condition (37) holds with Tk i -I-0 only when the coupling constraint gk,i (-) is met wi t h equality. Finally, by simply looking at (24), the proof follows.
• Taking advantage of the result stated by Proposition 3, the following distributed algorithm is then proposed. Table I . e. Compute the vector whose elements are
Repeat fr om 2) and 6) until the maximum number of iterations is reached or a suitable stop criterion is achieved.
Finally, it is worth noting that the proposed distributed ap proach is equivalent to the projection method with variable steps described in [19, 
,------------------------------------

VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS AND CONCLUDING REMARKS
This section, we infer further insight into the performance of the proposed algorithm via numerical simulations. The case of S = 4 SCUs coexisting in the same geographic area with Ml = 2 one-hop and M2 = 2 two-hop MUs is discussed. The following system setup is used: i) the average signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) on the generic kth chan nel defined as SNRk = lE { I Hk,k (nW } / (}� (n) is set to 0 dB for MUs, and 6 dB for SCUs and RSs; ii) the aver age signal-to-interference ratio (SIR) is defined as SIRk = lE { I Hk,k (nW } / ( Lj#lE { I Hj,k (n) 1 2 }) ; iii) the interference channel is composed of N = 16 subchannels; ivY the max imum normalized power is fixed to Pk ,i = N for any active node k at time step i; v) the circuit power is set to IJ! k = 1 for all k; vi) the starting point of the distributed algorithm is the uniform power allocation strategy, i.e. Pko1 = IN. Fig. 2 presents the average power consump t ion of the relay nodes. Note that the relay strategy consists in maximizing their EE while guaranteeing at least the same information rate of the source-to-relay link. As apparent, at the equilibrium, this enables a consistent power saving even if a minimum rate is guaranteed to MUs. Finally, Fig. 3 compares the end-to-end spectral efficiency (between source and destination) obtained by the MUs as a function of the interference level.
Conclusions: In this paper, we have developed a distributed power control strategy for relay-aided heterogeneous networks. Thanks to a proper reformulation of the optimization problem as a QVI, the transmission power of each terminal is chosen so as to maximize the preferred utility function, which can be either the information rate or the energy efficiency (possibly subject to a minimum rate constraint). By making use of a sequential penalty approach, we have demonstrated that the GNE problem associated to the proposed heterogeneous game can be solved in a distributed manner.
